The implementation of the Climate Paris Agreement in West Africa

Situation Analysis of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and capacity building needs

EXPERTISE FRANCE

CILSS

PROGRAMME INTRA-ACP DE L'AMCC+ Une initiative du Groupe des États ACP financée par le Fonds européen de développement de l'Union européenne

AMCC+
ALLIANCE MONDIALE CONTRE LE CHANGEMENT CLIMATIQUE



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GCCA+
THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ALLIANCE PLUS INITIATIVE

INTRA-ACP GCCA+ PROGRAMME An initiative of the ACP Group of States funded by the European Union's European Development Fund

Preface

West Africa faces climate change : the need of a regional concerted response

The African continent is at the core of the climate change challenges of this first half of the 21st century. West Africa hereby is the testimony of that reality through the negative impacts it is enduring and the difficulties that States are facing to tackle them, therefore diminishing their abilities of adaptation, mitigation and biodiversity preservation.

Indeed, five of the ten most vulnerable countries of the planet are in West Africa while our Region still largely presents resource-intesive business models contributing to the degradtion of our environement, such as low-productivity extensive agriculture, advanced degradation of soils and forests, increasing extractive industries. West African economical growth challenges are therefore intertwined with the need of switching to « low-carbon pathways ».

West Africa will also experience a temperature raise of 2.5°C by 2065 in the Sahelian regions. Rainfalls evolution will be more erratic, with an overall increasing trend in the coastal areas while the west of the Sahelian strip will suffer from a drastic decline. These two phenomena superimposed will lead to an increase of the frequency and intensity of extreme climatic hazards already known in our Region: high winds, floods, rainfall irregularity, coastal and soil erosion in river basins, extremely long pockets of drought, etc. with dramatic human and economic consequences on infrastructure, health, food security, natural resources and so on.

Given the urgency and severity of the situation described above, "ACTING TOGETHER" in the framework of regional solidarity, will undoubtedly allow our Region to reduce its vulnerability to climate change consequences, if not risking that policies and initiatives will not produce the expected effects and impacts.

Hence, it is necessary to operate the regional levers to facilitate the implementation of the Paris Agreement, especially taking into consideration that the Nationally Determined Contributions (CDN) represent the main and transversal tools used by West African countries to steer their actions and policies regarding climate change.

To this end, in accordance with the mandate of regional institutions and particularly the one of ECOWAS, and with the contribution of all actors, technical and financial partners, potential actions have been identified to support the Member States, among which: (i) pooling efforts to create economies of scale, (ii) strengthening regional leadership, particularly during negotiations, (iii) regional capitalization on public policies and innovative practices, and (iii) supporting national policy initiatives and orientations.

This report serves as a vehicle for re-launching the strategic thinking about the role of ECOWAS and other West African institutions in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, which shall be accelerated and deepened over the next few years to face the pressing issues our countries and planet are experiencing. It provides a regional overview of the impacts of climate change in our region, but also presents West African climatic actions and commitments, as well as capacity building needs of our member states, and other actors, to achieve them.

Sékou SANGARE
Commissionner for Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources

[1] *Selon le rapport de la Banque Africaine de Développement « Perspectives économique en Afrique 2019»*

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List of acronyms

AAFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGIR	Global Alliance for Resilience
ARAA	Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food
AU	African Union
BOAD	West African Development Bank
BUR	Biannual Updated Report
CB	Capacity building
CBIT	Capacity Building Initiative Transparency
CC	Climate Change
CCT	Council of Local Governments
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEREEC	ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy
CILSS	Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel
COP	Conference of the Parties
CRA	Agrhymet Regional Centre
CRC	Climate Resources Centre
CSA	Climate-Smart Agriculture
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EE	Energy efficiency
EU	European Union
GCCA+	Global Climate Change Alliance
GCF	Green Climate Facility
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
ICAT	Initiative for Climate Action Transparency

INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting, Verification
NAMA	Nationally appropriate mitigation action
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
PA	Paris Agreement
PPDU	ECOWAS Infrastructure Projects Preparation and Development Unit
RE	Renewable energies
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WASCAL	West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WRCU	Water Resources Coordination Unit

Executive summary

Between the pre-industrial era (1850–1890) and today, the global average temperature has increased by over 1°C. A number of impacts are expected in territories – increase in water stress, desertification, increasing scarcity of natural resources, soil erosion, droughts, etc. – and are barriers to the achievement of the 17 SDGs. The Paris Agreement (PA) lays the foundations essential to a global governance ensuring there is consistency between the international commitments and the public policies implemented at the national and local levels, via a common tool for the 180 party countries: the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), which aims to reflect mitigation and adaptation commitments, at their highest level of ambition given the circumstances of each country. This "dynamic" agreement is based on a transparency framework, whose modalities are still under discussion. The rules which will be defined in terms of the revision of the NDCs and the measurement, reporting and verification concerning the achievement of the commitments will be universally applicable with, however, flexibility for developing countries.

Africa is central to the challenges of climate change in this first half of the 21st century, both for the mitigation component, given its strong economic growth and demographic growth, and in terms of adaptation, given the impacts of climate change, which can already be observed, but also the major challenges of development and the fight against poverty affecting a number of African countries, in particular in West Africa. However, African countries, and in particular the LDCs (11 out of the 17 countries targeted in the context of this diagnostic), remain insufficiently financed, equipped and supported to address the challenge and create an environment conducive to the implementation of the NDCs. Yet the 17 countries of the ECOWAS zone + CILSS (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, Senegal, Sierra Leone) have all made commitments under their 1st NDC between 2015 and 2018, for a potential total of emission reduction of some 900 $MtCO_2$ by 2030. But this potential for reductions remains highly theoretical, as it is mainly conditional upon the inflow of international climate finance, which is still very limited, despite recent progress. In addition, several barriers related to the modalities for the management and monitoring-evaluation of commitments, the translation into public policies and sectoral regulations, access to appropriate techniques and technologies, etc. hamper this implementation. But the situation is not homogeneous in the 17 countries and the existence of recognised "West African climate champions" can constitute both a strength and a potential threat to regional integration.

Furthermore, five of the ten most vulnerable countries in the world are among the countries concerned by the GCCA+ West Africa programme and the future vulnerabilities to the climate of West African communities will be different, as the climates are today in this vast West African territory. While this agroecological complementarity today constitutes an asset, the exacerbation of climate differences and the general deterioration of rainfall conditions call for regional cooperation frameworks to be strengthened.

The priority sectors for the NDCs in the region concern sectors in which regional institutions are already active (agriculture, land use, energy, water). Consequently, given their mandate for regional integration, ECOWAS and the partner regional institutions (CILSS, WAEMU) can naturally contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement via 5 types of action:

(i) The pooling of efforts in order to create economies of scale, for example, on subjects related to climate data acquisition, processing and analysis, but also in order to address "niche" issues which cannot be handled individually by each country (research, training);

(ii) The pooling of efforts in order to strengthen regional political leadership, in particular in the context of climate negotiations, but also for the mobilisation of financing;

(iii) The creation of platforms for regional exchanges of information and experience, with the aim of promoting regional solidarity;

(iv) The use of the community regulatory mechanism to suggest (guidelines) or impose (regulations) moves towards low-carbon and resilient development paths;

(v) Specific interventions at national level in order to translate regional orientations into public policies and national regulations, at the request of Member States.

Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) fits in with this context. It is the second phase of an initiative of the same name launched by the European Commission (EC) in 2007 with the aim of strengthening the dialogue and cooperation in the field of the fight against climate change between the European Union (EU) and the most vulnerable developing countries. The GCCA+ initiative comprises i) a "Global" component, composed of programmes set out by country under the supervision of local EU Delegations, and ii) an "Intra ACP" component under the coordination of the ACP Secretariat in Brussels, which is itself divided into subregional components, one of which focuses on West Africa. The expected outcomes of the GCCA+-West Africa programme are as follows:

- EO1. ECOWAS and its specialised bodies develop operational and institutional capacities that meet the needs of member countries (+ Chad and Mauritania) in the focus areas of GCCA+, in international climate negotiations and in the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

- EO2. The strategies and priorities – regional (ECOWAS) and national (country members +2) – for climate change supporting the focus areas of GCCA+ for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in member countries are strengthened and their implementation is supported.

- EO3. Adaptation pilot projects, including solutions based on an ecosystem approach, already tested and implemented in ECOWAS countries and serving as references for future replication, are scaled up (extension or replication).

- EO4. Regional organisations and ECOWAS member countries step up the strategic dialogue, strengthen their negotiation capacities, and share information, skills, results and knowledge in terms of climate action.

- EO5. The capacities of technical institutes, universities and regional centres to provide training, research and support services for innovation in sectors related to climate change adaptation and mitigation are strengthened (training of teams, equipment).

- EO6. With a view to future support via climate finance and investments, innovative approaches involving the public and private sectors for climate and economic resilience are prepared and tested.

To specify the type of activities to be conducted, a diagnostic study has been requested in order to draw up a regional overview of the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This report firstly comprises a national component, whose objective is to analyse the commitments set out in the NDCs and progress in their implementation since 2015, but also the priority and structural needs and issues faced by the 17 countries in the area to accomplish this task. A second component seeks to present the overabundant "service offer" of regional and international institutions to support the implementation of the NDCs in order to highlight possible synergies and any shortcomings and weaknesses in existing services.

I. Context

1.1. The Paris Agreement and Nationally Determined Contributions as a response to global climate challenges

1.1.1. A universal international response to address the current climate emergency: the Paris Agreement

According to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), between the pre-industrial era (1850–1890) and today, the global average temperature has increased by over 1°C. The trend for global warming is therefore an undeniable reality. The rise in the level of seas and oceans, the increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme climate phenomena and the disruption of precipitation patterns are all already observable manifestations of climate change.

A number of impacts are expected on the livelihoods of communities – increase in water stress, desertification, increasing scarcity of natural resources, soil erosion, droughts, etc. – and are barriers to the achievement of the 17 SDGs. The fight against climate change is therefore both a question of justice and a prerequisite for the fight against poverty and inequalities worldwide.

The Paris Agreement,[1] ratified by almost all the Party countries (180 in September 2018) at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), lays the foundations essential to a global governance ensuring there is consistency between the international commitments and the public policies implemented at the national and local levels.

However, this Agreement remains fragile in many respects. The negotiations on its effective implementation are long and complex. The announcement of the US withdrawal in June 2017, Australia's recent pullback in terms of its targets to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the climate-sceptic declarations by Vladimir Putin are all threats which exacerbate the fragile nature of the Agreement. Finally, it should be recalled that the initial assessment, conducted by the UNFCCC Secretariat, of the aggregated impact of the NDCs is well below the scientific recommendations aiming at maintaining the increase in temperatures at a level below 2°C and, therefore, even more so for maintaining it below the 1.5°C threshold.

1.1.2. A universal Agreement based on Nationally Determined Contributions: a few reminders on the process

During the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP), which was held in Warsaw, Party countries agreed "to begin or to intensify domestic preparations for their nationally determined contributions", with a view to COP21. This led to the drafting of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for all Party countries to UNFCCC, which were submitted to the Secretariat prior to COP21.

These contributions had a number of objectives: (i) Assess the contribution of countries to the overall objective of limiting the temperature increase to +2°C; (ii) Demonstrate the level of political commitment of the governments of the Parties; (iii) Give effect to the integration of climate issues into the national policies of countries; (iv) Involve as many stakeholders as possible in the fight against climate change and (v) Strengthen and improve the coordination of institutional processes in national governments and regional institutions. In addition, they result from an integrated and constructive process involving many stakeholders. Facilities have been set up for several developing countries to assist national governments in the preparation of this overall planning document. As it was initially to be based on mitigation commitments, the representatives of developing countries insisted on also being able to include an adaptation dimension, which has been the case for almost all of them.

However, these INDCs were prepared before the development and entry into force of the Paris Agreement and were not based on the regulatory framework established by the Agreement. The main difference with the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is consequently that they are post-agreement and therefore an integral part of it. It should be noted that several countries, including in West Africa, made significant changes between the INDC and NDC. Once the regulatory framework of the Agreement has been finalised, according to the provisions made by the signatories to the Agreement, the Parties will have to revise up their respective contributions every five years,[2] with the need for each successive NDC to show a progression compared to the previous cycle (Article 4.3).

[1] *Paris Agreement: https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf*

[2] *Parties may, however, update and revise their NDC at any time, outside these mandatory provisions, in accordance with the principle of progression*

However, it should be noted that this point of revising NDCs is related to the scope of application of the NDCs (Article 3 of the PA) and to the relation with the Adaptation Communication (Article 7 and APA4), but also to the characteristics and information for clarity, credibility and transparency implemented for the mitigation part of the NDCs (Article 4, APA3), and to the transparency framework (Article 13). A consensus was reached at the Katowice Conference (COP24, CMA-1, December 2018) for the partial adoption of the "Rulebook" under the Paris Agreement Work Program, which constitutes a manual of procedures, modalities and guidelines that is sufficiently clear to make the Paris Agreement operational at the national and international levels. Only one provision of the Paris Agreement dealing with Article 6 the cooperative approaches with or without market could not be operationalized. However, beyond Article 6, negotiations on the modalities for the implementation of the Paris Agreement must be understood as a continuous process, taking into account the experience gained, and to which all countries must fully participate. For instance, if it was decided that the common schedule of NDCs would be applicable from 2031, but there was no consensus on the duration (5 and / or 10 years) of NDCs. New discussions are expected on this item in Bonn in May 2019, at the next meeting of the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies and the Paris Agreement.

1.2. The GCCA+ Intra ACP programme

The ECOWAS Commission is implementing the GCCA+ West Africa regional project alongside its technical and operational partners (CILSS and Expertise France). This project is being financed by the European Union and is part of the overall Intra-ACP programme of the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA+), an initiative of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States.

The second phase of an initiative launched by the European Commission in 2007 – one of the three priorities of GCCA+ – resides in strengthening the capacities of the targeted countries. Indeed, the two pillars which shape the alliance concern the political and technical dialogue and the support for the implementation of national climate change adaptation and mitigation policies.

The operational implementation of the project has a budget of EUR 12.1 million. It will start in the autumn of 2018 and continue until the end of 2022. The GCCA+ West Africa project will contribute to the regional effort for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, in particular by strengthening the capacities of West African regional institutions. Pilot assistance activities will also be implemented with certain governments and actors.

The expected outcomes of this programme are as follows:

- EO1. ECOWAS and its specialised bodies develop operational and institutional capacities to meet the needs of member countries (+ Chad and Mauritania) in the focus areas of GCCA+, in international climate negotiations and in the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

- EO2. The strategies and priorities – regional (ECOWAS) and national (member countries +2) – for climate change supporting the focus areas of GCCA+ for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in member countries are strengthened and their implementation is supported.

- EO3. Pilot adaptation projects, including solutions based on an ecosystem approach, already tested and implemented in ECOWAS countries and serving as references for future replication, are scaled up (extension or replication).

- EO4. Regional organisations and ECOWAS member countries step up the strategic dialogue, strengthen their negotiation capacities, and share information and skills, results and knowledge on climate action.

- EO5. The capacities of technical institutes, universities and regional centres to provide training, research and support services for innovation in sectors related to climate change adaptation and mitigation are strengthened (training of teams, equipment).

- EO6. With a view to future support via climate finance and investments, innovative approaches involving the public and private sectors for climate and economic resilience are prepared and tested.

[2] *Les Parties peuvent toutefois actualiser et réviser leur CDN à tout moment, en dehors de ces dispositions obligatoires, conformément au principe de progression.*

This report aims to draw up a regional overview of the implementation of the Paris Agreement in order to specify the activities of the GCCA+ programme. It firstly comprises a national component, whose objective is to analyse the commitments set out in the NDCs and progress in their implementation since 2015, but also the priority and structural needs and issues faced by the 17 countries in the area to accomplish this task. A second component seeks to present the "service offer" of regional and international institutions to support the implementation of the NDCs in order to highlight any shortcomings and weaknesses in this offer.

1.3. West Africa in the face of climate change

This diagnostic focuses on 17 West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

1.3.1. West Africa: a subregion particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change

The reality of climate change is unquestionable at global level and even more so in West Africa,[3] which is particularly vulnerable to the effects and impacts of climate change. The ND Gain Index – Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative – makes it possible to visualise the scale of this.[4]



Figure 1 : Map of vulnerabilities, ND Gain Index

[3] *Source: IRD – Rural societies in the face of climatic and environmental changes in West Africa, 2015.*

[4] *According to this index, vulnerability is: "the predisposition of a country to be negatively impacted by climate hazards". It is based on six key sectors including a total of 45 indicators: (i) Food, (ii) Water, (iii) Health, (iv) Ecosystem services, (v) Habitat and (vi) Infrastructure. Vulnerability is defined by three components: (i) Exposure: "The degree to which the inhabitants of a country and its six sectors are under the constraint of the climate"; (ii) Sensitivity: "The degree to which the inhabitants of a country and its six sectors are affected by climate-related perturbations"; (iii) Adaptive capacity: "The ability of the inhabitants of a country and its six sectors to adjust to reduce potential damage and to respond to the negative consequences of climate events"*

Climate change therefore exacerbates existing vulnerabilities which are not necessarily directly related to them.

This map particularly highlights the situation of vulnerability to climate change faced by almost all Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, as shown in Figure 2 below, five of the ten most vulnerable countries are among the countries concerned by the GCCA+ West Africa programme.

Rank	Country	Income group	Trend	Score
172	Eritrea	Low	=	0.598
173	Mali	Low	↓	0.614
174	Liberia	Low	=	0.616
175	Sudan	Lower middle	=	0.618
176	Guinea-Bissau	Low	=	0.625
177	Solomon Islands	Low	=	0.634
178	Micronesia	Low	↓	0.640
179	Chad	Low	=	0.650
180	Somalia	NA	↓	0.678
181	Niger	Low	↑	0.680

Figure 2 : List of the most vulnerable countries in the world, ND Gain Index

All West African States have included an adaptation component in the NDC, thereby highlighting the urgent need to strengthen their resilience in several priority areas depending on their geographical context (agriculture, livestock raising, natural disaster risk reduction, coasts, etc.).



Figure 3 : Bioclimatic zones in West Africa (Source: USGS)

However, there are very contrasting climates in West Africa (Figure 3): desert in the North (annual precipitation < 200 mm), Sahelian in the centre (annual precipitation ranging between 200 mm and 600 mm), Sudanese moving towards the South (annual precipitation ranging between 600 mm and 1,200 mm) and Guinean in the coastal countries in the South of the region (annual precipitation > 1,200 mm).

The future climate vulnerabilities of West African communities will also be contrasted. Despite uncertainties related to the climate models used (including in the recent context of the CORDEX[5] initiative) and the strong natural climate variability in the region, the average temperature increases are set to be high with an extremely marked North-South gradient (Figure 4), directly affecting soils and ecosystems due to a higher level of evapotranspiration. The situation is less clear (and marked by very strong uncertainties over climate models) concerning average precipitation, with marked reductions in precipitation only in the North-West (Senegal and Mauritania) and sometimes major increases (up to 10%) in the South-West (Guinea, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire), but generally a certain stability of precipitation from now until the middle of the 21st century. Furthermore, the intensity of extreme weather phenomena (floods, sand storms, drought) is likely to increase, while over the past 30 years, over 75% of the West African population has been affected at least once every two years by this type of hazard.

While this agroecological complementarity is today an asset,[6] despite structural deficits in agricultural productivity, the exacerbation of climate contrasts and the general deterioration of rainfall conditions call for regional cooperation frameworks to be strengthened.



Figure 4 : Projected changes in average temperature (comparison between the period 2046–2065 and the reference period 1998–2014)[7]

[5] *hhttp://www.cordex.org/*

[6] *"The Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) supply coastal countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo) with livestock (sheep and cattle) and dry cereals, while coastal countries export fisheries products, and cereals such as maize, roots and tubers to the Sahel" (ECOWAP Strategic Policy Framework 2025, December 2016, Department of Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources of ECOWAS (DAEWR)*

[7] *Stanzel, P., Climate Chance impacts on West African rivers under an ensemble of CORDEX climate projections, Climate Services (2018)*



Figure 5 : Projected changes in average precipitation (comparison between the period 2046–2065 and the reference period 1998–2014)

For example, the Sahelian climate, in which Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and partly Burkina Faso and Nigeria, are located is based on a fragile balance with a strong economic dependence on water availability for a mainly non-irrigated agriculture, yet which accounts for 40% of GDP in the Sahel region. This water availability is mainly provided by a complex rainfall system based on monsoons over a period of three to four months between June and September, but marked by extremely high interannual and intra-annual variability. The projected rise in temperatures (up to +6°C by 2100), combined with an increase in the variability of precipitation,[8] will lead to major impacts on agriculture and livestock raising, mainly pastoral farming, and more generally on living conditions for populations. These conditions will accelerate population movements towards the South of the West African region, in particular in urban centres. The example of the great drought in Burkina Faso over the period 1960–1990 gives an idea of the scale of future migrations: at that time, about 1 million people left Burkina Faso for the large West African cities.



Figure 6 : Projected changes in the flows of the main West African rivers for the period 2046–2065 compared to the period 1998–2014 (Source: Stanzel, 2018)

[8] *USAID, Climate Change Risk in West Africa Sahel: Regional Fact Sheet, April 2017*

Similarly, an average of some 40% of surface water resources in West African countries originate outside the borders of these countries. Several West African countries have a dependency rate on resources located upstream of up to 90%.[9] With projections of major declines in flows on certain transboundary rivers (Figure 6), only taking into account the influence of climate change (and not the use of water resources), impacts on regional stability can be expected. At the same time, the population of the continent is tending to rapidly urbanise. By 2040, almost 6 Africans out of 10 will be living in cities, exacerbating the issue of supplying and managing water resources in cities. The 5 existing watershed organisations, but also regional institutions, therefore play and will be playing a key role.

1.3.2. Significant and indispensable mitigation potential, but underexploited

GHG emissions in West Africa account for barely 1.8% of global emissions,[10] whereas it is home to 5% of the world population. The individual carbon footprint of West African populations is therefore well below the global average (0.35 $t_{eq}CO2$ per capita in 2010 [11], against a global average of 4.8). However: (i) there are extremely marked contrasts in the region, with carbon footprints up to 10 times higher from country to country, (ii) the basic needs of their populations are generally very partially met (with, for example, access to electricity ranging between 9% for Niger and 87% for Cape Verde),[12] (iii) 3 out of the 10 countries with the strongest growth in 2018 around the world will be in West Africa[13] (Ghana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire).

Consequently, the decisions of today will or will not put West Africa on the path to low-carbon and resilient economies, in particular concerning access to sustainable energy for all.

West African countries are all signatories to the Paris Agreement and have submitted mitigation commitments for GHG emissions via their NDCs, taking the related national specificities into account, in particular, to urgently meet the basic needs of their populations. These commitments for West Africa account for a total mitigation potential of some 900 Gg (gigagrammes) by 2030, i.e. 2.2% of projected global emissions by 2030.[14] This potential remains modest compared to the global heavyweights for emissions, but it needs to be seen over the long term, as the development choices today, in particular concerning the energy mix, will create a lock-in effect over several decades in fast-growing economies (economic and demographic). Yet the total costs expressed by the 17 West African countries to implement the commitments included in their NDCs stands at USD 337 billion by 2030[15] (i.e., in proportion to the population of the region, some USD 870 per capita), a far cry from the current figures for international climate finance flows. The lack of financial resources for the implementation of the African NDCs is expressed by all as being a major barrier,[16] with international climate finance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa remaining stable, at some USD 12 billion (bearing in mind that some 20% was channelled to South Africa).

Yet out of the West African countries which have clearly expressed the distribution between external and internal sources of financing, some 80% of costs should be covered by international climate finance. This therefore amounts to saying that African countries are only willing to invest USD 175 per capita over 15 years (i.e. still USD 12 per capita per year) to engage their countries on low-carbon and resilient paths. Despite recent efforts in a number of countries to better integrate the climate into development planning (see Part 2), the fact remains that the fight against climate change is still often considered as an additional cost which goes against the fundamental development needs of countries. However, it should be noted that:

[9] *USAID, Climate Change and water resources in West Africa: transboundary river basins, August 2013.*

[10] *According to 2010 World Bank data.*

[11] *However, this average masks a strong standard deviation between countries, related to both different demographies and country-specific economic models.*

[12] *Source: Country profiles, ECOWREX, http://www.ecowrex.org/page/country-profiles*

[13] *Source: World Bank.*

[14] *Analysis based on the 17 NDCs or INDCs registered in the UNFCCC registry.*

[15] *According to the NDCs registered in the UNFCCC registry: http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx*

[16] *African NDCs Gap Analysis Report, African Development Bank, 2018.*

(i) The achievement of the SDGs is inseparable from mitigation and adaptation efforts:[17] the SDGs with a strong social component strengthen mitigation actions, as reducing the vulnerability of populations to the impacts of climate change and strengthening their capacities to adapt depend on improving their standard of living (SDGs 1 and 10), reducing food insecurity (SDG 2), their access to a quality health system (SDG 3) and education system (SDG 4), and reducing inequalities, including gender inequalities (SDGs 5 and 10). For the mitigation component, the implementation of sustainable consumption and production patterns (SDG 12) requires decoupling economic growth and the use of natural resources and, therefore, fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions. Similarly, preserving and restoring terrestrial ecosystems (SDG 15), and particularly sustainable forest management, is essential for effectively fighting for mitigation.

(ii) The costs of adaptation could amount to up to 6% of Africa's GDP in a world at +4°C (1% in a world below +2°C).[18] They would amount to between USD 50 billion and USD 95 billion a year by 2050. Consequently, the investment today in the adaptation and resilience strategies of territories would significantly reduce the costs of tomorrow related to the management of impacts if adaptation was only "responsive".

1.4. Regional institutions essential for the coordination of the fight against climate change in West Africa

1.4.1. Respective mandates of regional institutions

In the context of this study, the regional inter-State cooperation institutions studied were as follows: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). We also mention regional watershed institutions given their role in terms of cooperation at the territorial level of a watershed. Other institutions operate at regional level in terms of the fight against climate change, as we will see in Part 3. They are, however, led by either pan-African institutions or international actors. Consequently, we have only selected here institutions created at the initiative of West African States, which are dedicated to the cooperation – mainly economic – of these States.

It should first be noted that as the geographical areas of these institutions are not common, certain duplications or overlaps are likely to limit the coordination of efforts. However, a gradual convergence process for regional organisations, on the basis of their recognised competences, is ongoing and several initiatives are being jointly led by these institutions.

ECOWAS, which was created in 1975, aims to "promote cooperation and integration, leading to the establishment of an Economic Union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member States as well as to contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent." It is composed of seven main institutions:

- The Authority of Heads of State and Government;
- The Council of Ministers (foreign affairs);
- The Parliament (elected by indirect universal suffrage via a secondment from national parliaments);
- The Economic and Social Council;
- The Court of Justice;
- The ECOWAS Commission (whose main role is to implement the decisions of the Authority of Heads of State and Government). It is composed of a President, a Vice President and 13 commissioners. The institution is managed via 14 sectoral departments whose task is to implement ECOWAS programmes and apply the regional policies;
- The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

[17] *According to the SDG Climate Analysis Brief, 4D, December 2017.*

[18] *UNEP Adaptation Gap Report, 2016, http://africanclimatefinancehub.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Africas_adaptation_gap_2_Bridging_the_gap_mobilising_sources_2015.pdf*

In addition to these governance bodies, the ECOWAS mechanism is complemented by 11 specialised technical agencies, several of which are directly linked to the fight against climate change. The institutions specialised in key sectors of the fight against climate change are already mobilised to support member countries: Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food – RAAF, ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency – ECREEE, Water Resources Coordination Centre – WRCC, ECOWAS Infrastructure Projects Preparation and Development Unit – PPDU. ECOWAS is therefore a strong vehicle for cooperation between States and for sound national public policies integrating climate issues, in particular on energy, infrastructure, agriculture, the environment and water.

The objective of EBID is to contribute to the economic development of West Africa by financing public and private projects in the fields of transport, energy, telecommunications, industry, services, poverty reduction, the environment and natural resources.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) was created in 1962 (formerly the West African Monetary Union) with the objective of "creating, in West Africa, a harmonised and integrated economic space, based on the totally free circulation of people, capital, goods, services and production factors, as well as the effective right of practice and establishment for people working independently and of residence for citizens throughout the community territory". It is composed of eight coastal and Sahelian States, linked by the use of a common currency, the FCFA (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo).

WAEMU is headed by the following bodies:

- The Conference of Heads of State and Government;
- The Council of Ministers;
- The Commission;
- The Court of Justice;
- The Court of Auditors;
- The Inter-Parliamentary Committee;
- The Regional Consular Chamber;
- The Council of Labor and Social Dialogue;
- The Council of Territorial Authorities, which has an interesting particularity among the regional institutions, as it is the only consultative body that promotes, at regional level, a multi-level system of governance and that seeks to support the WAEMU Commission in the design and implementation of integrating and structural projects for the Union's territorial authorities.

In 2015, WAEMU had stated its intention of strengthening its climate approach via several of its programmes (urban development, renewable energies, environment).[19]

The West African Development Bank (BOAD) is the common development finance institution of WAEMU States. The Member States are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. It contributes to the achievement of WAEMU's objectives for the economic integration of West Africa.

The Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) was created in 1973 following the great droughts which struck the Sahel region in the 1970s. It includes 13 States: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Cape Verde. The mandate or overall objective which guides the action of CILSS is to work on seeking food security and fighting against the impacts of drought and desertification, for a new ecological balance in the Sahel region. CILSS is headed by:

- The Conference of Heads of State and Government;
- The Council of Ministers;
- The Regional Monitoring and Programming Committee;
- The Governing Board.

CILSS mainly works on the following policies in the ECOWAS space: national food security strategies, national action plans for combating desertification, national strategies for domestic energies. This mandate is in some respects similar to ECOWAS and the geographical area of the CILSS space has now been extended. In 2010, closer ties were established between the two institutions, without

[19] *WAEMU's actions on adaptation to climate change, 2015.*

this being formalised for the time being, in order to make CILSS the technical arm of ECOWAS. The political bodies undertake "the necessary steps under the direction of ECOWAS, with the goal of making CILSS an institution specialising in rural development, fight against desertification, natural resource management and climate change, at the disposal of all inter-African integration organisations, while preserving its identity, autonomy and specificity." In addition to an Executive Secretariat, CILSS has two specialised technical institutions: the Sahel Institute and AGRHYMET Regional Centre.

In addition to these institutions covering most West African countries, several watershed basin organisations[20] have the objective of promoting cooperation between their Member States, jointly managing these vital shared resources and defusing possible tensions between States. All the main transboundary rivers in West Africa now have common organisations. These basin agencies are sometimes older than the institutions mentioned above and do not all have the same purpose (border/transboundary river, size of the basin, number of member countries, type of cooperation actions). Some of these agencies sometimes go further than simply managing the natural resources (transboundary river) and preventing conflicts, by promoting an enhanced economic cooperation framework[21] in several fields (agriculture, waterway transport, energy, etc.). This is, for example, the case of:

- The Mano River Union (MRU), a regional institution comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, which aims to promote economic cooperation between these countries in the field of trade, industry, agriculture, natural resources management, transport and telecommunications. It was created in 1973 and experienced a withdrawal period in the 1990s due to the internal conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In 2008, the Heads of State decided to structure the Unit and give it new means of action.
- The Niger Basin Authority (NBA), one of the oldest African Intergovernmental Organisations (1964). NBA has a mandate to promote cooperation between member countries and ensure the integrated development of the basin in all fields by developing its resources in terms of energy, water, agriculture, livestock raising, fishing, fish farming, forestry, logging, transport and communication and industry. The Member States are: Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.
- The Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), comprising Gambia, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.

1.4.2. What potential role(s) to address the many future climate challenges?

As we have seen above, the fight against climate change calls for clear national efforts. However, regional coordination is essential, in particular for the adaptation component given the risks inherent to the strong contrasts/disparities in situations in the region. But by contributing to the creation of a strong regional market, the institutions dedicated to economic integration can also contribute to strongly encouraging mitigation efforts by focusing on low-carbon development paths.

All the regional institutions have become well aware of this climate issue, as demonstrated by the sector policy documents, most of which include the climate change constraint: ECOWAS Environmental Policy[22] (2008), Renewable Energies Policy (2015), Intervention Framework for Climate-Smart Agriculture Climate in the Sahel and West Africa (2015),[23] Strategic Orientation Framework for 2025 of the ECOWAS Agriculture Policy (2017),[24] ECOWAS Policy and Mechanisms for Disaster Risk Reduction (2006), CILSS Work Programme 2015-2019 (2015), BOAD Environment and Climate Strategy 2015–2019[25] (2015), etc.

[20] *Mano River Union, Autorité du Bassin du Niger, Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Gambie, Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad, Autorité du Bassin de la Volta, Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal*

[21] *Tabarly S., La frontière, discontinuités et dynamiques Bassins versants transfrontaliers en Afrique Occidentale, 2008, Géoconfluences*

[22] *ECOWAS Environmental Policy, ECOWAS Environment Directorate, 2008, http://www.ecowrex.org/system/files/repository/2008_ecowas_environmental_policy_-_ecowas.pdf*

[23] *ECOWAS Renewable Energy Policy, ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (ECREEE), 2015, http://www.ecreee.org/sites/default/files/documents/ecowas_renewable_energy_policy.pdf*

[24] *http://araa.org/sites/default/files/media/Cadre%20d%27Orientation%20Strat%C3%A9gique%20ECOWAP%202025%20FR.pdf*

[25] *https://www.boad.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/STRATEGIE-ENVIRONNEMENT-ET-CLIMAT-2015–2019.pdf*

Following the ambitious objectives of the sectoral policies of ECOWAS[26] and its partners, several important examples of the major role played by regional institutions in the fight against climate change can be noted:

- Electricity transmission throughout the region allows significant savings and a better use of renewable resources, which reduces the use of thermal power plants. For example, the region has created (by decisions in 1999 and 2006) the "West African Power Pool (WAPP)". This network of high-voltage lines aims to connect the national power grids in the region. It is the result of political impetus by ECOWAS, coordinated with public-private agreements and cooperation between electricity companies in the region, with all this supported by international capital and expertise.

- More generally, "the implementation of the CET [Common External Tariff] by all ECOWAS member countries is an important stage in consolidating the regional market, boosting the regional generation capacity and investment, and deepening economic integration in West Africa".[27] The implementation of the CET paves the way for the creation of new instruments in the subregion, which would oblige countries to strengthen cooperation and pool everyone's interests, including in sectors with the highest mitigation potential (transport, power generation, etc.). In the longer term, model carbon pricing tools could be considered, based on reflection conducted in certain countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal).

- The effort to pool resources in order to set up climate data production and processing systems, via the AGRHYMET Regional Centre or Hydromet platform, addresses the challenge of the limited resources of Member States. In addition, given the diversity of climates in the region and the impact of extreme events on population movements within the region, a principle of subsidiarity may quite naturally be applied in this field.

- The development of common positions for West African States in international negotiations via the organisation of workshops to prepare the negotiation sessions, but also the creation of regional Alliances (Global Alliance for Resilience – AGIR; West African Alliance for Climate-Smart Agriculture...) contribute to giving the subregion a greater voice on the international stage, by affirming "climate-compatible" development choices.

Furthermore, prior to COP21 in 2015, ECOWAS, CILSS and WAEMU stated major common political ambitions[28] and the Ministers of Environment of the Member States of ECOWAS, WAEMU and CILSS have a common position[29] urging developed countries "to respect their commitments under the agreement, notably in terms of support in order to ensure the full and comprehensive implementation of the INDCs submitted by countries in the subregion". This therefore demonstrates that the climate issue is fully integrated and translated into concrete actions. In this respect, it should be noted that BOAD has been accredited by the Green Fund since 2016 and plans to mobilise an annual budget of FCFA 50 billion to finance climate-related projects by 2021, by using the financing mechanisms of UNFCCC.

[26] *For example, the renewable energy policy aims to "increase the share of renewable energy penetration in the energy mix, in particular large-scale hydropower to 35% by 2020 and 48% by 2030".*

[27] *Source: ECOWAS Institutional Report, 2016.*

[28] *See in particular: Blaustein, E. & A. Rialhe, « Les actions en faveur du climat en Afrique de l'Ouest », Les Cahiers de Global Chance, n° 37, June 2015 and Roadmap for COP21 (ECOWAS, CILSS, WAEMU, BOAD).*

[29] *http://www.ifdd.francophonie.org/media/docs/nouvelles/386_Declaration_Dakar_CECEAO-CILSS-UEMOA_7nov2015.pdf*

II. Analysis of Nationally Determined Contributions

2.1. Methodology

At national level, the diagnostic was conducted via:

- The definition of the analytical framework of the 17 NDCs, comprising three components:
  - The planned mechanism or the needs identified to develop the existing mechanism in order to fulfil the measurement and reporting requirements in the commitments made in the context of the application of the Paris Agreement (governance/ management system established, development of legislative, regulatory and institutional frameworks, actions to strengthen capacities and knowledge, etc.);
  - The fields of national priorities for climate change (mitigation and adaptation);
  - The cooperation actions considered and mentioned with national or regional technical institutes, universities and training centres.
- The documentary review of the 17 NDCs (or INDCs for Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, as the NDCs are not yet registered in the UNFCCC registry) and of any other document providing information on progress in the implementation of the NDCs.
- The sending by e-mail of a questionnaire (semi-open questions) to the climate focal points of the 17 targeted countries, in order to collect missing information for the establishment of the diagnostic of needs, in particular with regard to the ongoing capacity building initiatives in the region and identify the priorities of national actors. 15 questionnaires out of 17 were returned to us[30]. They were sometimes partly completed with clarification questions by e-mail or phone interviews.

This part highlights the main elements of the analysis. More detailed tables including information by country are given in the Appendix Book.

2.2. A West African region marked by a high degree of heterogeneity in climate commitments

2.2.1. Processes to prepare NDCs and comparability

It should first be noted that most countries in the West African region were supported in 2015 for the preparation of their INDCs and certain countries sometimes beyond this with continuous support for the implementation of the NDC itself (such as Mali with GiZ): by AFD (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Togo), GiZ (Ghana, Mali, Gambia), UNEP DTU (Guinea Bissau, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria) and UNECA/ACPC (Liberia). However, several of them note that the process to prepare INDCs was conducted hastily without, however, ever completely cutting corners on the crosscutting nature of the consultation (interministerial or multi-stakeholder).

Certain estimates or strategic orientations were corrected between the INDC and NDC in several countries. This is, for example, the case of Mali, which finally opted to no longer make a difference between conditional and unconditional scenarios, "which in reality did not move [them] forward" and recently revised the implantation costs for the 2022-2030 period. It is also the case of Benin, whose calculation of the implementation costs was revised down between the INDC and NDC. Senegal's NDC, for its part, is going to be substantially changed compared to its INDC version, with notably the inclusion of the oil and gas sector, given the recent discoveries of major offshore deposits, whose exploitation will start rapidly. Consequently, the projected volumes of emissions are going to increase sharply in absolute value (and the associated reductions as well). The NDC is expected to be validated by the end of 2018/beginning of 2019.

Consequently, despite the tight schedule for the preparation of documents, the processes have continued in most countries, with climate action now being seen as a continuous commitment which must be conducted in synergy with the national development

[30] *Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo*

[31] *See the study conducted by the International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV of 52 countries in 2016 – http://mitigationpartnership.net/sites/default/files/indc_as_catalyst.pdf*

objectives. Climate change would appear to have been taken up a notch everywhere in the agenda of national priorities.[31] However, in most countries, there is still a very strong need to refine the diagnostics, the assumptions of emission scenarios, the MRV provisions and the analysis of financing needs. Furthermore, some countries clearly mention this in their NDC (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Gambia) and are even specifically programming these additional studies.

Country	Priority sectors (mitigation)	Integration of LULUCF in emissions scenarios	Comitment period
BENIN	LULUCF, ENERGY	✗	2021-2030
BURKINA FASO	LULUCF, ENERGY	✓	2015-2030
CAP VERT	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT, WASTE	Non applicable	2025-2030
CHAD	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT	✓	2010-2030
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT	✗	2016-2030
GAMBIE	ENERGY, WASTE, INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES, TRANSPORT	✗	2021-2025
GHANA	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT, WASTE, INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES	✗	2010-2030
GUINEA	LULUCF, ENERGY	✗	2016-2030
GUINEA BISSAU	LULUCF, ENERGY	✓	2020-2030
LIBERIA	LULUCF, TRANSPORT, WASTE	✗	2015-2030
MALI	LULUCF, ENERGY	✓	2015-2030
MAURITANIA	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT, INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES	✓	2020-2030
NIGER	LULUCF, ENERGY	✓	2015-2030
NIGERIA	LULUCF, ENERGY, WASTE	✓	2015-2030
SENEGAL	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT, INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES	✓	2016-2034
SIERRA LEONE	LULUCF, ENERGY, TRANSPORT, INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES	Non applicable	2020-2049
TOGO	LULUCF, ENERGY	✓	2020-2030

Priority Sectors

- LULUCF
- ENERGY
- TRANSPORT
- INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES
- WASTE

Figure 7 : Framework of the 17 NDCs in the region

At the time of the preparation of the INDCs, the lack of guidelines from UNFCCC and the sovereign nature of the information included in the INDCs led to very different formats and methods between countries, including in the ECOWAS zone. There was also no specific work to converge methods between the donors who supported countries. This heterogeneity is in particular grounded in:

- Reference years which range from 1994 (Guinea) to 2012 (Côte d'Ivoire), depending on the last inventory of emissions or the last available national communication;
- Categories of emissions included in the emissions trajectories ranging from 1 to 4 sectors[32];
- A sequestration potential (LULUCF[33] sector) calculated for 3 countries and included in the calculations of emissions trajectories for 2 countries (Chad, Mali). The LULUCFsector is therefore considered as a net emitter for the 5 other countries which have included the sector in their NDC. The lack of forest inventory data is a major barrier to the inclusion of this sector in the NDCs for many countries in the ECOWAS zone;
- Very different levels of details on the implementation methods from country to country.

[32] *In the case of Burkina Faso, the transport sector has been included in the energy sector.*

[33] *LULUCF – Land use, land-use change and forestry.*

It should be noted, however, that the countries have:

i) Established their commitment period until 2030, with a few exceptions (Gambia – 2025, Senegal – 2035 based on the Emerging Senegal Plan, Sierra Leone – 2049);

ii) With the exception of Sierra Leone and Cape Verde (which have not submitted mitigation trajectories), worked on Business As Usual (BAU) emission scenarios,[34] based on exponential growth, compared with mitigation scenarios;

iii) Submitted two mitigation scenarios – unconditional (investments already programmed) and conditional (subject to obtaining international climate finance), for over half of them;

iv) All include an adaptation component.

In terms of the sectors covered by the NDC commitments, for all countries, agriculture and the land sector, as well as the energy sector, are priorities for action. Furthermore, 9 out of the 17 countries have included the waste sector. It is worth noting that this sector has sometimes been excluded solely due to a lack of reliable data to establish a baseline situation in terms of GHG emissions (for Guinea, for example). 5 out of the 17 countries have established objectives for transport and 5 also for industrial processes. Ghana covers the most sectors.

2.2.2. Political management and governance

Most of the 17 countries have established the management of the preparation and implementation of the NDC at the level of their Ministry of Environment, involving other Ministries in the validation and operation phases. The specific case of Niger should be noted, where there is a joint management between MESUDD – Ministry of the Environment, Urban Sanitation and Sustainable Development and SE/CNEDD – National Council for Environment and Sustainable Development, under the supervision of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, 7 countries have set up dedicated management platforms, including various ministries and other stakeholders (non-State actors), and Mauritania has set up a network of climate focal points in the various ministries.

This establishment at the level of the Ministry of Environment is sometimes perceived as a weakness in view of the limited power of this Ministry, in particular in budgetary decisions. However, the formal nature of the commitment towards the international community (and in particular in view of the presence of Heads of State at COP21) prompted involvement at the highest level of States, with a good level of awareness-raising at the highest level of the State (President/Prime Minister), which remains to be applied in the other Ministries (in particular those related to planning and the budget).

[34] *It should be noted that Togo has chosen different terms: "Projection With No Measurement – SAM", corresponding to BAU for the other countries and BAU GACMO for the unconditional mitigation scenario (implementation of measures already planned).*

Table 1 : NDC management mechanisms in the 17 West African countries

Country	Lead Ministry	Other ministries involved	Existence of dedicated management platforms
Benin	Ministry of Living Environment and Sustainable Development	Ministries of agriculture, energy, water, transport, health, decentralisation and the interior and public safety	No
Burkina Faso	Ministry for Environment, Green Economy and Climate Change via SP CNDD	Ministries of agriculture, animal resources, health, energy, transport, research, urban planning, habitat, economy and finance, women.	No
Cape Verde[35]	Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, Food Security, Water and Sanitation		No
Chad	Ministry of Environment, Water and Fisheries / Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport and Civil Aviation		Designated National Authority of the Green Climate Fund in Chad (AND-FVC) since September 10th, 2018 (decree)
Côte d'Ivoire	Ministry of Environment		Enhanced governance framework since the NDC was registered: creation of a National Climate Change Committee including a wider range of actors than the Interministerial Climate Change Committee (CICC) initially planned
Gambia	Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Resources	Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs	No
Ghana	The Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation is responsible for the overall coordination of the NDC process and, in partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), ensures that the MRV system is fully operational.	The sectoral ministries, in partnership with the private sector, are responsible for the application. The Ministry of Finance must facilitate efforts to mobilise resources in and outside the Government. The National Development Planning Commission will ensure that the NDCs are always in line with the development priorities of the ruling Government.	No
Guinea	Ministry of Environment, Water and Forestry	Other sectoral ministries (agriculture, mines, livestock raising, energy, decentralisation, development, etc.)	No (a specific platform had been set up prior to COP21 to prepare the INDC)
Guinea-Bissau	State Secretariat for the Environment	Ministry of Agriculture, Energy and Finance (General Direction of the Plan)	No (NDC Partnership – Ministry of Environment & Ministry of Finance (General Direction of the Plan)
Liberia	Environmental Protection Agency	No governance framework established; desire to develop it when the NDC is revised	No

[35] *The questionnaire was not returned to us; here, we are using as a basis the results of the survey of the African Development Bank in early 2018 with a view to the NDC Hub programming*

Country	Lead Ministry	Other ministries involved	Existence of dedicated management platforms
Mali	Ministry of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development	The Environmental Agency acts as a facilitator for the process; the National Planning Directorate is responsible for financing issues. The other sectoral ministries concerned are responsible for the implementation of priority projects defined in the NDC investment plan	National Climate Change Committee (interministerial)
Mauritania[36]	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development	Network of Sectoral Climate Change Focal Points in ministerial departments	
Niger	A National Committee to monitor the implementation of the NDC was set up on 11th January 2018 chaired by the Secretary General of MESUDD (Ministry of the Environment, Urban Sanitation and Development) with five vice-presidents: Technical Advisor to the Water, Sanitation and Environment Unit at the Presidency of the Republic, Secretary General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Secretary General of the Ministry of Energy, Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning, Executive Secretariat of the National Council for the Environment for Sustainable Development	All Key Sector Ministries; - The Office of the President of the Republic (Agriculture and Livestock Unit); - The Office of the Prime Minister; - Executive Secretariat of the National Council for the Environment for Sustainable Development; - Civil Society Organizations and development associations in the field of environment and SD; - The private sector; - Youth and women's organizations. All of these actors are members of the National Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of the NDC and are part of four thematic commissions (Adaptation, Mitigation, Capacity Building & Technology Transfer and Resource Mobilization)	Order No. 0014 / ME / DD / SG of January 11, 2018 establishing, attributing, organizing and operating the National Committee in charge of monitoring the implementation of the NDC
Nigeria	Ministry of Environment		Interministerial Committee on Climate Change
Senegal	Ministry of Environment	Sectoral ministries	National Committee on Climate (COMNACC) including all the ministries concerned, local authorities, private sector, civil society, research institutes, etc.
Sierra Leone	Environmental Protection Agency (EPA-SL).	Ministry of Finance. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure. Ministry of Transport and Aviation. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security. Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Meteorological Agency of Sierra Leone.	Coordination of actions via intersectoral meetings.
Togo	Ministry for the Environment and Forest Resources	Sectoral ministries	National NDC Committee (key ministries and non-State actors (NGOs, technical and financial partners, Chamber of Commerce, employers, research institutes)

[36] *The questionnaire was not returned to us; we are therefore using information available in the NDC and in the INDC National Report (edited in September 2015) as a basis here*

2.2.3. Significant mitigation potential but still theoretical

Methodological issues make the comparison difficult, and even more so data aggregation at the level of the subregion. However, bearing these methodological considerations in mind, it is estimated that the subregion would be able to avoid over 900 $MtCO_2$ of emissions a year by 2030 (excluding Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone), if all the conditional and unconditional commitments were implemented. But the share of unconditional efforts is often confined to the minimal (see Figure 8), meaning that the mitigation effort is strongly related to inflows of international climate finance. A total of at least USD 340 billion would be required for the period 2015-2030 (excluding Cape Verde, Gambia and Liberia) to implement the conditional efforts. Given the fact that financial flows are still very limited, this reduction potential therefore remains highly theoretical.

However, there are wide disparities in the estimate of the costs of implementation for the NDCs (See Figure 8): when they are measured per capita and per year, they range between USD 119 USD (Sierra Leone) and almost USD 4,000 (Mauritania). This ratio of 1 to 33 is undoubtedly not related to lesser needs (Sierra Leone and Mauritania are ranked at the same vulnerability level by the ND Gain Index),[37] but to different calculation methods: Have they only taken into account the "additional" share of the fight against climate change, in addition to the obvious development needs, or, on the contrary, all the needs exploiting the obvious link between the SDGs and the fight against climate change? Has the estimate of these costs taken into account the cost of human capacity-building over the long term? While these estimates, which have often been made urgently, had the interest of giving an idea of the overall financing gap prior to COP21, they need to be refined with a view to a real budgetary management and in order to determine what level of effort can reasonably be supported at national level.

It should be noted that in terms of the fight against climate change, Nigeria has a predominant place in the subregion. For example, its population is almost equivalent to the total of the 16 other countries in the area of interest of this study. Logically, its emission potential, in the case of a Business As Usual (BAU) scenario in 2030, forecasts an emission level of 892,840 Gg, CO_2 equivalent. Yet the aggregation of emission forecasts, in the same scenario, for all the other countries for which data are available, amount to a reduction of emissions of some 665,000 Gg. Consequently, over half of the commitments for emission reductions (conditional and unconditional) are made in Nigeria.

The issue of the comparability of emission data arises very regularly, including with sources reputed to be robust. For example, the GHG emission data from the World Bank database (https://data.worldbank.org/) generally do not correspond to the data from the national communications of countries in the region, with sometimes very significant differences. The example of Senegal is very telling: the World Bank shows a volume of GHG emissions of 50,288 Gg in 2005, whereas Senegal's 3rd national communication, released in 2016, shows 13,084 Gg.

As this study is not intended to point out all these gaps, we emphasise the indicative nature of comparisons and quantitative data.

[37] *https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/*



Figure 8 : Mitigation commitments of the 17 West African countries

1. Côte d'Ivoire

On the conditional/unconditional distribution
→ Côte d'Ivoire has established a single scenario, but mentions that this "low-carbon scenario [...] could be subject to additional external support".

On the calculation of costs
→ Data aggregated by the author

2. Guinea-Bissau

On the estimate of emissions in 2030
→ Guinea-Bissau has not specified emissions data in its INDC for 2030, or quantified potential reduction "due to the fact that there are no detailed preliminary studies to formulate quantifiable actions".

3. Mali

On emissions data and potential reduction
→ These data are calculated by the author on the sectors included in the NDC, excluding sequestration potential. Indeed, Mali has included sequestration potential in its objectives via the regeneration of forests and plantations. We have not included it in these infographics for the sake of comparability with the other countries in the zone.

On costs
→ The calculation of costs is made for the period 2022-2030 and has been refined since the 1st NDC.

4. Niger

On costs
→ The calculation of costs is made for the period 2020-2030 (unlike the other countries in the zone for which the start date is in 2015).

5. Senegal

On general data
→ As the NDC is not yet available in the UNFCCC registry, the data in these infographics are based on the INDC of 2015.

On mitigation potential
→ Author's estimate for 2030 based on emission projections for 2035.

6. Togo

On BAU data (outer circle)
→ In Togo's NDC, this scenario is called "Projection Without Any Measurement – SAM".

On reduction potential (inner circle)
→ The unconditional scenario is called BAU GACMO in Togo's NDC (implementation of measures already planned).

7. Nigeria

On the estimate of potential reduction
→ Author's estimate, by adding the potential of the various sectors.

8. Cape Verde

On the estimate of emissions in 2030
→ Cape Verde has not specified emissions data in NDC for 2030, or quantified reduction potential.

9. Sierra Leone

On the estimate of potential reduction
→ The data cannot be derived from the analysis the NDC. However, Sierra Leone has an overall red tion target to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 ("*against this backdrop, that this INDC intends to ma tain the emission levels of Sierra Leone relatively L (close to the world average of 7.58 MtCO2e) by 2035 neutral by 2050 by reducing her carbon footprint a by following green growth pathways in all econor sectors*".)

10. Gambia

On BAU data (outer circle)
→ Author's estimate

11. Liberia

→ Liberia ratified the Paris Agreement on 28 Aug 2018, thereby transforming its INDC into an NDC v hout additional revision. We consequently used d currently available in the UNFCCC registry as a basis

*To facilitate the graphic readout, certain scales concerning the redu tion potential have been modified as follows:
- The data for Nigeria have been divided by 4;
- The data for Gambia, Mauritania and Liberia have been multiplied

Figure 9 : The mitigation commitments of the 17 West African countries – Explanatory Notes

2.3. Review of the implementation of the NDCs – Main points concerning progress in the implementation of contributions

All the climate focal points who replied believe that their country is on track to achieve their commitments and that the actions implemented since 2015 will ensure the unconditional component. However, the conditional component (for those which have set it out) requires massive investments. Most countries mentioned several programmes or projects under implementation in their priority sectors, for either the mitigation or adaptation component. We do not specifically give the details of this below, but provide them in the Appendix.

▷ **Institutional mechanism**

Several countries have expressed their desire to strengthen the commitments made in their NDC during a forthcoming revision. Indeed, Togo indicates: "In 2015, we grouped together all the ongoing projects/programmes to make up the NDC, but which is only a "bunch" of actions already engaged. There is now a need to make real studies to consolidate data with a view to the next NDC revision". There is therefore a real concern to give credibility to the commitments by conducting additional studies which are an integral part of the implementation, as we have seen above.

In this respect, one example is Côte d'Ivoire, which has conducted several additional studies mentioned in the NDC since 2015: a study to release investments in the context of renewable energies; a diagnostic study on climate-smart agriculture; a study on mapping financial flows related to BUR+; a financial assessment of Côte d'Ivoire's NDC to estimate the costs related to implementation.

It should also be noted that several national or transnational projects aim to increase the availability of robust climate data required for the development of informed public policies. This is, for example, the case with:

- The Hydromet programme in Mali, led by the World Bank, cofinanced by GCF and implemented by Mali's Civil Protection Directorate. It will support the capacity building, expansion and upgrading of hydrometeorological observation networks. A national network of "climate services" will be established and initiatives for flood and drought warning systems will be implemented at local level.

- The Spatial Observation of Forests in Central and West Africa programme-OSFACO[38] (2016–2019) implemented in 8 countries (Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo). It consists of (i) the provision of very high-resolution Spot 6 & 7 satellite imagery on a territory covering 683,000 km^2, (ii) the mapping of land use and land-use change, and (iii) technical, institutional and human capacity building for the processing and use of the data produced. This programme thereby provides a response to the weakness identified in a number of African NDCs, which find it difficult to provide reliable data on the LULUCF emissions sector.

Some focal points mentioned the need to further institutionalise the implementation of the NDCs, by setting up really operational and dynamic national coordination mechanisms and establishing roadmaps for the implementation of the NDCs. In this respect, examples include Nigeria, Guinea and Mali (supported by GiZ and UNDP), which recently adopted an operational roadmap. Another example is the case of Côte d'Ivoire, which has clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the implementation of the NDC (see Table 2) and Mauritania, which has set up a network of sectoral focal points within Ministries since 2015. This is also the case with Senegal, which significantly improved its stakeholder consultation and validation process during the revision of the INDC initially submitted in 2015.

[38] *http://www.ignfi.fr/fr/content/une-surveillance-satellite-renforce-des-forets-d%E2%80%99afrique-centrale*

Table 2 : Role and responsibilities of stakeholders in the implementation of the NDCs in Côte d'Ivoire

Type of institution	Name of the stakeholder	Possible role
Government institutions	Presidency / Vice-Presidency Prime Minister	Creation of strong institutions in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation
	Ministry of Planning and Development	Technical input in terms of planning the process and its implementation
	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development	Development of the national climate change strategy and implementation and monitoring of climate actions
	Ministry of Agriculture / Ministry of Water and Forests / Ministry of Energy / Ministry of Health / Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research	Technical input in terms of sectoral planning and the implementation of climate change strategies
Research and development structures	Research Centres	Research, analysis and implementation
	SODEXAM/National Meteorology Service	Provision of climate data
	National Rural Development Support Agency	Support for implementation
Technical and financial partners	United Nations Development Programme/ United Nations Environment Programme/ Global Environment Facility /World Bank/ African Development Bank	Technical and financial support, advice, capacity building
Private sector	Côte d'Ivoire General Confederation of Businesses (CGECI) / Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI)	Participation in implementation via CSR
Local communities	Populations, community groups, traditional leaders	Participate as targets
NGOs and territorial authorities	NGOs and others, ARDCI, UVICOCI	Take part in the development and implementation

Finally, there is no consensus in countries in the zone about the issue of the pre-2020 revision of the NDC. Some countries, such as Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire consider that there is no reason to conduct it given the ongoing negotiations at UNFCCC on the methodologies and start date for the 5-year cycles (See Section 1.2.2.). But a pre-2020 revision is planned for several countries:

- Very partially, by focusing on either the modification of reference data (publication of the 2nd national communication for Guinea; the 4th for Niger; the BUR 2019 for Mali) on emission trajectories (Benin), the addition of a new emissions sector (LULUCF for Gambia);

- Or more generally, for Ghana, for example, which will validate a new NDC by the end of 2018, with a revision of the baseline scenario, the budget and the translation into sectoral strategies in order to operationalise the NDC. The reduction targets have also been revised up for the conditional and unconditional components.

Several countries (Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger) explicitly emphasise that they will need specific support for the revision of this first NDC.

▷ Legislative and regulatory framework

Among the progress related to the implementation of the NDCs, the strengthening of the legislative framework has officially set out the ambition and priority nature of the fight against climate change in a limited number of countries:

- In a symbolic manner, in the new draft Constitution of Burkina Faso (put to a referendum in 2019), climate change issues are set out in the Preamble: "CONVINCED of the absolute need to preserve and protect the environment, prevent and fight against the adverse effects of climate change, in the interest of present and future generations".

- In a very operational manner in Benin, with the law concerning mainstreaming climate change voted in June 2018[39]. The process which led to this law being voted lasted over a year and was supported by international technical assistance by GiZ. It should be noted that Côte d'Ivoire is currently working on a similar law which could act as a driver for the implementation of Côte d'Ivoire's NDCs (with support from GCCA+-EU), as the Orientation Law on Sustainable Development adopted in 2014 does not take into account certain provisions of the Paris Agreement. This is also the case for Senegal.

- At the regulatory level, via the review of sectoral regulations. This is the case in Senegal via the revision (ongoing) of the Energy Sector Development Policy Letter, in Guinea via the revision of the Forestry and Environment Codes, and in Ghana via the revision of the law on renewable energies.

However, it is clear that this legislative and regulatory component is still in the early stages of development and that substantial support is required. In this respect, it should be noted that it sometimes took a long time to ratify the Paris Agreement,[40] despite a relatively high level of political ownership: Cape Verde, Chad, Togo and Mauritania only ratified the Agreement in 2017. Liberia did so on 27 August 2018 and Guinea-Bissau on 22 October 2018, recently turning their INDC into an NDC (without, however, making revisions).

▷ Establishment in sectoral strategies and public policies

One of the main areas of progress mentioned by the focal points of the 17 countries lies in the revision of the strategy or public policy documents taking account of the NDC commitments. These major developments underscore the level of importance that the fight against climate change has taken on in a crosscutting manner with, however, different levels of progress from country to country, with certain countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Mali and Ghana, having made faster progress on this issue.

[39] *http://www.bj.undp.org/content/benin/fr/home/presscenter/articles/2018/05/une-loi-sur-les-changements-climatiques-au-benin.html*

[40] *Source : https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en*

Table 3 : Implementation of NDCs in the sectoral policies of the 17 countries

Country	Alignment with public policies
Benin	National Development Plan 2016–2025 validated after the NDC National Adaptation Plan under preparation Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.
Burkina Faso	The National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES) 2016–2020 refers to the climate (but not specifically to the NDC) Sustainable Development National Policy and Law Version 2 of the National Rural Sector Programme (PNSR 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account. National Adaptation Plan NAMA Framework
Cap Vert[41]	Not specified
Chad	National Development Plan 2017–2021 Vision 2030 '' Chad we want '' National Strategy to Combat Climate Change National Framework of Climate Services National Rural Sector Investment Program National environmental policy Global Alliance for Resilience Food and nutrition governance Social and nutritional protection Improvement of agricultural and food production
Côte d'Ivoire	Since the adoption of the Paris Climate Agreement, several country documents and strategies have included the climate issue. The country has greened the National Development Plan (2016-2020), which was developed during the preparation of the NDCs. In this NDP, area 4 clearly addresses Adaptation and Mitigation by integrating REDD+. Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account. Besides this, the country is working on mainstreaming climate change (based on the content of the NDC) into sectoral planning.
Gambie	A national climate change policy has been approved and launched recently. Integration of climate considerations into the national health policy Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme of Gambia (PNIAG) is under preparation and will integrate the climate change and resilience aspects.
Ghana	Several sectoral policy documents are under preparation or revision: - Renewable energies and nuclear energy policy - Climate-Smart Agriculture strategy - REDD+ strategy Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.
Guinea	Several policy documents are under revision (including the REDD+ Strategy) Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.
Guinea-Bissau	No, due to a lack of financial resources Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has integrated the climate and resilience aspects (4.7 Programme)

[40] *The questionnaire was not returned to us; here, we are using as a basis the results of the survey of the African Development Bank in early 2018 with a view to the NDC Hub programming*

Country	Alignment with public policies
Liberia	Development of the Pro-Poor Agenda for Prosperity and Transformation, in line with the NDC commitments Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.
Mali	The National Adaptation Plan under preparation integrates the priorities of the NDC; The Agriculture Sector Adaptation Strategy has been developed integrating the NDC; The National Environmental Protection Policy has been revised on the basis of the NDC; Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.
Mauritania[42]	Not known
Niger	The 2017–2021 Economic and Social Development Program has taken into account the issues related to climate change at the level of Axis 5 (Sustainable Management of the Environment) whose objectives are consistent with those of the CDN; The National Policy on Environment and Sustainable Development, adopted in 2016 and its Action Plan (2017–2021) took into account certain issues related to Climate Change and other emerging and new issues, including Sustainable Land Management (SLM); The Strategy for Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth, Niger 2035, took into account the risks of climate change and natural disasters in all development sectors. Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.
Nigeria	National Environment Policy Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) is under preparation and will integrate the climate and resilience aspects.
Senegal	The Programme to Revive and Accelerate Senegalese Agriculture (PRACAS II); The National Agricultural Investment Programme for Food Security and Nutrition (PENIASAN); The National Territorial Development Plan; The Emerging Senegal Plan; The Integrated Water Resources Management Action Plan (PAGIRE); The sectoral policy letters for fisheries and water resources; Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) is under preparation and will integrate the climate and resilience aspects.
Sierra Leone	No document revised
Chad	National Development Plan 2017–2021 Vision 2030 '' Chad we want '' National Strategy to Combat Climate Change National Framework of Climate Services National Rural Sector Investment Program National environmental policy Global Alliance for Resilience Food and nutrition governance Social and nutritional protection Improvement of agricultural and food production
Togo	Not known Version 2 of the National Agricultural Investment Programme (PNIA 2.0) has taken the climate change issue into account.

[42] *The questionnaire was not returned to us*

▷ Mobilisation of financing

All the countries say that the lack of financial resources is the main barrier to the implementation of the NDCs, as the bulk of financing is expected from bilateral and multilateral climate finance. Indeed, the creation of one or several accredited entities with direct access to the Green Fund is a priority for all the countries which do not have any yet.[43] Several support actions are ongoing in this regard (CBIT by UNDP, German cooperation, Adapt'Action, GCF Readiness Programme, GCCA+). In this respect, it is worth noting that the strategies of countries differ in terms of accreditation, with some submitting the application for several entities at the same time, thereby responding, as Mali has done, to a logic of windows by types of actor.[44]

To date, very few countries have accessed climate finance since 2015, even if some have done well (Ghana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Mali), sometimes via private investments;[45] their experience could benefit other countries in the zone. One example is Ghana which, since 2015, has launched or submitted several projects/programmes to climate donors: a REDD+ project (Cocoa) launched in 2015 and another REDD+ programme (Shea) under preparation for GCF financing.

Furthermore, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Niger mention the private sector as potential for investment, without, however, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso precisely quantifying it (Niger only quantifies the private investment potential for forestry). For several focal points, the lack of investment plans is a major barrier. Several countries have consequently made headway with the preparation of these documents for public donors and private investors. This is, for example, the case for Mali, supported by GiZ, which in 2018 validated an investment plan for the implementation of the NDC, as well as Cape Verde.

In addition, seeing that public international climate finance will not be sufficient to finance the implementation of the NDCs, several countries are exploring or scaling up the implementation of innovative financing mechanisms

- Senegal is currently conducting an opportunities study on carbon pricing. Furthermore, Senegal, which had clearly stated this as an objective in its NDC, mentions six new CDM projects: 4 have received the LoA and 2 have been registered by the CDM Executive Board.

- In July 2018, Togo officially validated its first REDD+ national strategy, with support from the World Bank, ultimately opening up the possibility of receiving payments for environmental services, thereby joining the "club" of REDD+ West African countries (Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana).

- The Nigerian Government is going to issue green bonds in March 2019, for an approximate amount of NGN 15 billion,[46] (USD 41.5 million) following a first successful issue in 2017. This "Green Bond Market Development Programme" initiative is supported by FSD Africa (UKAid).

West African countries are consequently being inventive in terms of mobilising financing and the experiences of these 17 countries should be subject to more structured exchanges, based on a rationale for regional integration and solidarity.

However, it should be noted that that there is generally no structured monitoring system for financing earmarked for the fight against climate change, apart from Ghana, which conducts this monitoring via its mechanism for the development of BURs. Côte d'Ivoire is planning to adopt this type of mechanism in the context of the ongoing GCF readiness support.

[43] *With the exception of Cape Verde*

[44] *3 national entities have been proposed (ANICT for local authorities, Mali Folk Center for civil society and the Bank of Mali for the private sector).*

[45] *This is, for example, the case for Ghana, which has had its Ghana Cocoa Forest Programme replenished with USD 5 million by the American company Mondelez International.*

[46] *Focal point NDC and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-greenbond/nigeria-to-devise-green-bond-issuance-program-by-end-2018-idUSKBN1KA2DO*

▷ Improvement in data production, collection and analysis and establishment of an MRV system

As mentioned above, the issue of the existence of quality climate data is, for many countries in the zone, a major challenge. In addition to technological constraints (for example, related to the acquisition and exploitation of satellite imagery to monitor commitments in the land sector, as mentioned above), the organisational mechanism is a major barrier.

Most countries in the zone have not defined the architecture for their MRV mechanism. Yet the success of the Paris Agreement is based on the issue of transparency, a sign of confidence between Party countries. Consequently, a transparency framework needs to be created in order to provide a clear image on the action and financial support (Articles 13.5 & 12), mentioning, however, that this framework must be non-intrusive, non-punitive, must respect national sovereignty, and must avoid placing undue burden (Article 13.3). In this respect, developing countries are given flexibility and must report "in the light of their capacities" (Article 13.2). This transparency framework should draw on the mechanisms of the Convention (BR/BUR), and the type of information submitted by each Party is described in the rulebook. The fact is that most of the time, the monitoring-evaluation systems are linked to the implementation of a project and stop working when the project reaches completion, thereby losing the "internal memory" for the development of a future report on the action.[47] There is therefore an urgent need to institutionalise simple but robust MRV systems which meet national management needs and international transparency needs.

Benin has opted for a sectoral MRV (through the Programming and Forward-Looking Department of each sectoral ministry, which has a view of all the programmes/projects in the sector) and Ghana a centralised MRV (via its National Development Planning Commission (NDP)), as well as Mauritania (monitoring-evaluation system of the National Action Plan for the Environment (SEPANE) extended to the NDC). Several countries are currently benefiting from support to structure these mechanisms (Mali, Niger).

[47] *https://www.iied.org/negotiating-transparency-for-paris-deal-next-stop-bangkok*

III. Capacity building: a key factor for the fight against climate change

3.1. A few reminders on capacity building

3.1.1. The different dimensions of capacity buildings

Capacity building is based on:

- Approaches, strategies and methodologies applied in order improve the performance of the individual/ organisation;
- A process through which human resources, as well as the organisational and operational capacities of institutions, are improved in order to better perform the priority functions.

Capacity building is a concept whose definition comprises several dimensions, meaning that the understanding of it varies from one actor to another. It interacts with several levels: the individual, the organisation, society or the environment.

- Individual level, which concerns any type of technical skills to perfect the performance of an action.
- Organisational or institutional level, which concerns issues relating to the identity of the organisation, its management, its partnership relations (between organisations), the development of its strategy, the management of its resources, etc.
- Level of the enabling or societal environment, which concerns issues relating to collaboration, partnerships, innovation, building trust, positioning in the environment, influence, etc.

3.1.2. Cadre normatif du renforcement de capacités (CCNUCC)

The Paris Agreement (Article 11.2) stipulates that "Capacity-building should be country-driven, based on and responsive to national needs, and foster country ownership of Parties, in particular, for developing country Parties, including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity-building should be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive."

A scope (non-exclusive) for capacity building actions is defined in the decision Annex 2/CP7, relating to the capacity building framework for developing countries.[48]

Following COP21, and within the framework set by the Paris Agreement, in 2015, the Paris Committee on Capacity-building was set up.[49] The main objective of this committee is to actually implement the provisions on capacity building provided for in the Paris Agreement. It is composed of 12 experts from developed and developing countries and aggregates needs and proposes priority actions to undertake in this context in order to inform the Parties about them during the COP. For 2019, the Committee has set the priority of the strengthening required for the effective implementation of the NDCs.

The drafting of the INDCs, prior to COP21, involved a number of stakeholders among the national actors responsible in the Party countries to UNFCCC. Lessons on capacity building and effectiveness were learned from these multi-stakeholder processes.[50]

[48] *Il inclut : (i) Le renforcement de capacités institutionnelles, incluant le renforcement, ou l'établissement, de secrétariats nationaux sur le changement climatique ou des points focaux nationaux ; (ii) L'amélioration et/ou la création d'un environnement propice ; (iii) Les communications nationales ; (iv) Les programmes nationaux de lutte contre les changements climatiques ; (v) Les inventaires de GES, la gestion des bases de données d'émissions et des systèmes de collecte, de gestion et d'utilisation des données des secteurs d'émissions ; (vi)'évaluation de la vulnérabilité et de l'adaptation ; (vii) Le renforcement de capacités pour la mise en œuvre de mesures d'adaptation ; (viii) L'évaluation pour la mise en œuvre des options d'atténuation ; (ix) La recherche et l'observation, incluant les services météorologiques, hydrologiques et climatologiques ; (x) Le développement et le transfert de technologies ; (xi) L'amélioration des processus de décision, incluant une assistance pour la participation aux négociations internationales ; (xii) Le mécanisme de développement propre ; (xiii) Les besoins émanant de la mise en œuvre de l'Article 4, paragraphes 8 et 9, de la Convention [spécifiant les géographies les plus exposées aux risques*

[49] *Source : https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/paris-committee-on-capacity-building*

[50] *Source : https://www.transparency-partnership.net/sites/default/files/challenges_lessons_indcs.pdf*

The 5 main lessons learned are as follows:

- Difficulties to assess the financial and human needs;
- Difficulties to assess the economic impacts and their co-benefits;
- Poorly synchronised political and technical processes;
- Limited availability of information and technical expertise on available options;
- Lack of capacity or personnel available at national level

Consequently, the main barriers identified by developing countries following the many capacity building initiatives are numerous. They all stress that the lack of financial resources allocated remains the main barrier, as it hampers the implementation of a national structure for the monitoring and effective implementation of actions. Furthermore, the lessons learned form support processes underscore the stumbling blocks related to the non-systematisation of the coupling between individual strengthening (targeting national experts and focal points) and organisational and institutional strengthening. Indeed, the technical training of operational teams is often jeopardised by a frequent turnover and therefore less effectiveness in the capacity building actions undertaken.

This feedback therefore allows the following observations to be made:

- Lack of coordination and consistency between the various thematic bodies, operational entities, implementing agencies and other organisations outside the Convention;
- Lack of regular supervision, analysis and revision of the capacity building activities and recommendations;
- Lack of regional, national and subnational cooperation able to lead to a long-term commitment by countries and a sustained capacity.

Consequently, to increase the operational efficiency related to the revision of contributions, there is a need to define as clearly as possible a framework for the preparation of the NDCs and allocate the financial means to it that would ensure the involvement of national and international technical partners. It is one of the roles which has been entrusted to the Paris Committee on Capacity-building.

3.2. Review of needs in terms of climate capacity building for the stakeholders of the 17 countries involved

3.2.1. Pain trends for the capacity building needs of the 17 West African countries concerned

The analysis of the needs expressed by the 17 countries concerned by the GCCA+ Intra ACP programme, both through their NDCs and questionnaires, shows several trends:

- There are significant needs in terms of technical assistance and advice for the Least Developed Countries, aiming at creating conditions conducive to private and public investment and mobilising climate finance.

- Countries almost unanimously emphasise the lack of access to reliable and robust climate data. This comes in addition to a lack of capacities to analyse the production of this data at national level and at local level. For example, in 9 of the 17 NDCs analysed, the LULUCF sector is absent due to the lack of recent forest inventories and reliable monitoring tools.

- Along the same lines, the issue of setting up an MRV system is a priority for most countries in the zone.

- The capacity to monitor existing climate finance flows is lacking in nearly all the countries concerned by this diagnostic. In addition to monitoring, there is demand from countries for specific MRV tools for these flows in order to maximise their capacities to access and anticipate climate finance.

- Most of the countries involved state the major need to be able to popularise the commitments made in the NDCs, in particular in order to facilitate their integration into the sectoral investment plans the most conducive to private investment.

- There is still the major issue concerning the creation and delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the various institutions responsible for the mitigation and adaptation activities at all levels of the territories. This includes major questions over the coordination framework of stakeholders – Is there a pilot ministry? What are its arrangements and interactions with the other actors? How are territorial levels (territorial authorities, local governments, etc.) supported? Etc.

- Strengthening is also desired by a few countries in order to build the capacities of States to realign all public policies and national and local development plans with the prerogatives of their NDC.

- Some countries identify a significant need to build their capacities for the regulatory application of the provisions set out by the NDCs (e.g.: Guinea for the territorial development master plan and mining code).

More generally, several categories of needs have been identified, as indicated in Figure 10. The figure on the right of the Figure shows, on an indicative basis, the number of countries in the zone which have clearly expressed the need in their NDC or in the questionnaire.



Figure 10 : Typology of the capacity building needs of the 17 countries

3.2.2. Detailed analysis of the needs expressed by the 17 countries involved

Details of the individual needs of the 17 countries expressed by the climate focal points, as well as of the specific ongoing support, are given in the following table:

Table 4 : Capacity building needs expressed by the 17 countries

Country	Needs	Ongoing support
Bénin	MRV system Capacities of institutions in terms of communication / popularisation of the content of the NDC among non-State actors (farmers, POs, private sector, etc.)	German cooperation for GCF accreditation CBIT-GEF to build capacities for the implementation of the NDC Cooperation with NDC partnership
Burkina Faso	Monitoring, evaluation and reporting (MRV) Knowledge of sources of financing and modalities of mobilisation Development of investment plans	Initiative "Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency" (CBIT) NDC Partnership to monitor the implementation of CDN GGGI support for GCF accreditation

Table 4 : Capacity building needs expressed by the 17 countries

Country	Needs	Ongoing support
Cape Verde[51]	The capacity building priorities are: - The strengthening of climate-related policies at local level; - The development of tools to integrate climate considerations into national planning tools; - Cost estimates; - Communication/popularisation; - Access to financing and mobilisation of financing (including private) - Mobilisation of actors.	Not known
Chad	The priority needs expressed are: - Awareness-raising at all levels on climate-related issues; - Access to financing. The underlying need is also expressed to focus on human development as a whole and the overall improvement in Chad's governance framework.	GCF readiness Under negotiation with UNEP DTU on support for the implementation of the NDC
Côte d'Ivoire	A review and capacity building for national actors will be implemented during the last quarter of this year in order to develop the national capacity building plan, which will be a 5-year matrix. The urgent and priority needs are: - The development of climate-related communication strategies; - Climate finance - Mainstreaming gender into climate-related issues; - The identification and formulation of structural projects and programmes according to the requirements of climate finance	GCCA+ on the preparation of the climate change law Accreditation support by the GCF Initiative "Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency" (CBIT) on the development of an MRV system for the monitoring of carbon abatement in the context of the NDCs
Gambie	- Cost estimates; - Links with sectoral public policies, in particular with the Low-emission Resilient Climate Strategy - Awareness-raising in school curricula; - Popularisation / communication; - Mobilisation of climate finance.	Ongoing support from UNDP on the preparation of the PAN (agriculture component) Ongoing UNDP/GEF support for climate forecasting and early warning systems Recent efforts to increase access to climate data and climate mainstreaming in local development planning. IIED support for the development of a long-term mitigation strategy and for estimating the costs of implementing the NDC.
Ghana	An NDC implementation plan has been prepared and identifies capacity building needs. The mobilisation of financing remains the top priority.	Not specified

[51] *The questionnaire was not returned to us; here, we are using as a basis the results of the survey of the African Development Bank in early 2018 with a view to the NDC Hub programming.*

Country	Needs	Ongoing support
Guinea	The needs are expressed in the 2015 NDC; the priorities are: - Strengthening of individual, institutional and systemic capacities - Monitoring-evaluation and reporting (MRV); - Preparation of an investment plan; - Knowledge of sources of financing and modalities of mobilisation; - Communication/popularisation of NDC commitments; - Coverage of important needs in the production of robust and accessible climate data, cross-cutting documents for medium-term strategic planning and monitoring of natural resources (in particular water and forestry, as well as meteorological data); these needs may be covered by bilateral agreements with certain regional bodies; - Promoting mainstreaming of climate change issues, particularly adaptation-related issues, into local, sectoral and national planning and budgeting; - Gender mainstreaming in all development programs and projects - Popularization and communication of information related to environmental law, the causes and impacts of climate change, in a process of awareness and education of the entire Guinean population; - Increased use of private finance, public-private partnerships undergoing prior assessments.	Ongoing support from the Adapt'Action Facility (improvement in the climate governance framework and coordination of the various institutions, support for the implementation of the GCF NDA) Ongoing support from GCF on readiness and accreditation Several support actions by CTCN
Guinea Bissau	Many needs for adaptation, mentioned in the INDC. Also considered priorities: - Communication / popularisation; - Mobilisation of financing; - Collect and analysis of climate data; - MRV system.	GCF support in progress: PAN formulation, Readiness Program OSS support on readiness program of the GCF for the establishment of a National Implementation Entity
Liberia	Many needs considered priorities: - Collection and analysis of climate data; - MRV system - Communication / popularisation; - Mobilisation of financing.	Ongoing GCF support: formulation of NAP, readiness programme, feasibility study for a project on coastal erosion. Support from CBIT on the MRV system MoU signed with UNDP for the introduction of a Master's in Environmental Sciences at the University of Liberia
Mali	Several needs are expressed in the NDC in terms of strengthening: - Institutional and legal: conflicts of jurisdiction; - Decision-makers: lack of information on climate change; - Scientific and technical: lack of expertise for the analysis of climate data; - Academic training: lack of structures; - Communities and local authorities: lack of information on impacts; - General public: lack of awareness-raising; - Media: lack of information.	Support from CBIT on the MRV system GiZ support for Green Fund accreditation World Bank for the strengthening of hydrometeorological and climate services

Country	Needs	Ongoing support
Mauritania[52]	The NDC mentions several capacity building needs, in particular for adaptation: - Strengthening the technical capacities of small agricultural producers - Strengthening the technical capacities of support services - Institutional capacity building in the livestock sector - Strengthening the institutional capacities of the structure in charge of nature protection (particularly in the application of forest legislation) - Strengthening the institutional and technical capacities of national and local structures in the planning, financing and implementation of adaptation measures in the field of nature protection - Strengthening the institutional capacity of sea control and fisheries research - Strengthening of skills in the field of pollution control - Capacity building of MEDD monitoring and evaluation structures	Not known
Niger	Niger especially emphasises multi-stakeholder capacity building. The priority needs are: - The setting up of bankable projects and command of the rules and procedures of donors; - The assessment of adaptation projects in terms of economic and financial analysis; - The establishment of an MRV system; - Knowledge and understanding of the INDC implementation process; - Good practices for carbon sequestration & management; - Soil mapping; - The rational management of liquid and solid waste	Establishment of an MRV system by CNEDD with support from GCCA (EU) AFD's Adapt'Action Facility (capacity building, implementation of the NDC in two or three sectoral policies in the field of adaptation already identified for the development of pastoral livestock farming in the Zinder and Diffa regions and the concerted formulation of a strategy and a plan National Adaptation Framework for Climate Change in Niger-SPN2A)
Nigeria	Nigeria gives precise details about its priority needs in terms of capacity building: - Development of methods to estimate, collect (inventories) and archive emission data; - Assessment of emissions in the industrial processes sector; - Development of an MRV system involving the relevant actors with, in particular, a strengthening of the Ministry of Environment; - Mass media campaign to raise awareness of the NDC objectives; - Improve the capacity to access climate finance	Programme to develop green bonds supported by FSD Africa (UKAid) GCCA+ on support for structuring governance with a view to the implementation

[52] *The questionnaire was not returned to us; we are therefore u sing information available in the NDC and in the INDC National Report (edited in September 2015) as a basis here.*

Country	Needs	Ongoing support
Senegal	Senegal gives precise details about its priority needs in terms of capacity building: - Support for the implementation of an MRV system for the LULUCF, waste and industry sectors and for adaptation; - Strengthening of stations and equipment to collect marine meteorological and coastal dynamics data; - Development of early warning systems; - Strengthening of the hydrological and subterranean data acquisition system; - Strengthening of the data acquisition, processing and management system; - Strengthening of the quality of the data series and archiving system; - Strengthening of the climate observation system; - Strengthening of capacities for climate models for each sector (Diva, MSSAT, DSSAT, Delf3D, WEAP, etc.); - Strengthening of technological capacities (cold production and storage, cogeneration and tri-generation technologies using biofuels for small and medium-sized capacities, replacement of clinker with ash from electricity power plants); - Need to build the capacity of actors (Senelec, private sector, education/research) in the context of the transfer of technologies: combined-cycle gas, but also dual diesel power plants (fuel oil/gas) and diesel power plants to adapt for the use of natural gas; - Archiving of documents, oceanographic model for which it is possible to have a 5 km resolution on Senegal's coasts; - Acquisition of storage servers for the output of climate models; - Improvement in the agricultural data collection, processing and management system; - Capacity building needs for the procedures of the various sources of financing and their criteria; - Development of bankable projects for an improved mobilisation of resources; - Development of an investment plan and implementation of the NDC; - Need to develop an operationalisation strategy for the NDC; - Meeting on the roundtable of donors with a view to the implementation of the NDC.	AFD's Adapt'Action Facility (monitoring-evaluation framework for the climate operations of DEEC/sectoral ministries) ICAT for MRV but focus on energy and transport Opportunity study on the implementation of a carbon pricing instrument, financed by CRC Lomé and the World Bank[53]
Sierra Leone	Needs identified: - Climate data and information; - Inventories and assessments of GHGs and assessment of climate vulnerabilities.	Support from CBIT on the MRV system
Togo	Many needs considered priorities: - Climate data collection and analysis; - Horizontal integration of the adaptation dimension at the national, subnational and local levels; - Mobilisation of financing.	GCCA+ for PALCC

[53] *http://crclome.com/atelier-de-lancement-a-dakar-de-letude-nationale-de-la-tarification-du-carbone-au-senegal/*

Conclusions and perspectives

A strategic reflection and the need to trigger dynamics on the role of regional institutions in the implementation of the Paris Agreement

As we have seen, several factors advocate for a regional management of the fight against climate change, starting with (i) the substantial intra-regional economic flows, in particular with regard to agricultural production, (ii) the high vulnerability of a number of countries in the region, (iii) the regional disparities (level of wealth and development, impacts of climate change, ownership of the climate issue) and, finally, (vi) the cross-border nature of the impacts of climate change. Failing to address these vulnerabilities and turn them into an opportunity to strengthen regional solidarity would mean transforming them into a threat to the stability of the region.

The NDCs were first intended to obtain a commitment from the international community, but today are the main crosscutting tool to manage climate action in the 17 countries in the zone. Their first edition comprises a number of weaknesses, as in all countries around the world. However, they remain an essential internal instrument to initiate the sectoral transformations required to meet the objectives set by the Paris Agreement, which has been ratified by the 17 countries.

In the priority sectors of the NDCs concerning sectors in which regional institutions are already active, given their mandate for regional integration, ECOWAS and partner regional institutions (CILSS, WAEMU) can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement via several capacity building actions, for the benefit of their member states. 5 types of action are possible, provided that two major principles are respected – a principle of subsidiarity, preventing it from substituting for Member States, and a principle of complementarity with the other competent regional institutions:

((i) The pooling of efforts in order to create economies of scale, for example, on subjects related to climate data acquisition, processing and analysis, but also with a view to addressing "niche" issues which cannot be covered individually by each State (research, training);

(ii) The pooling of efforts in order to strengthen a regional political leadership, in particular in the context of the definition of political and strategic orientations for combating climate change ,of climate negotiations, but also the mobilisation of means of implementation;

(iii) The creation of platforms for regional exchanges of information, experiences and practices, with a view to promoting regional solidarity;

(iv) The use of the community regulatory mechanism to suggest (guidelines) or impose (regulations) new orientations for progress towards low-carbon and resilient development paths;

(v) Specific support to member States to apply regional orientations in national public policies and regulations, in synergy and complementarity with other initiatives.

In this context, strategic reflection on the role of regional institutions in the implementation of the Paris Agreement needs to be updated, on the basis of the work conducted prior to COP21 to define a common position. This reflection will also need to take into account work in progress in the African Union to develop a pan-African climate strategy, for which the timetable is not known.

The existence of a strategic orientation framework and an action plan for the fight against climate change at the regional level could aims at:

(i) Providing a common vocabulary to engage in the implementation of the Paris Agreement;

(ii) Clarifying regional climate ambitions and strengthen the leadership of regional institutions;

(iii) Facilitating coordination between all the initiatives led at regional level on the climate component and ensure a more effective mainstreaming of climate issues into capacity building actions that do not target the climate;

(iv) Accelerating the implementation of the NDCs in countries;

(v) Contributing to avoiding policies or strategies that are in "contradiction" with the fight against climate change.

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